by Paul Krugman, W. W. Norton, December 1, 2008, 978-0393071016
Paul Krugman is a Nobel prize winner and generally renowned economist.
This book does an excellent job of pointing out the way the econonomy
is working today, and how it is related to various other crises.
Well-written and thoughtful. I have various disagreements with
Krugman, and those don't diminish the book's value to lay people and
economists alike.
[k85] But I have tried to avoid making this a dry theoretical
exposition. There are no equations, no inscrutable diagrams, and (I
hope) no impenetrable jargon. As an economist in good standing, I am
quite capable of writing things nobody can read. Indeed, unreadable
writing--my own and others'--played a key role in helping me arrive at
the views presented here.
[k114] In 2003 Robert Lucas, a professor at the University of Chicago
and winner of the 1995 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, gave the
presidential address at the annual meetings of the American Economic
Association. After explaining that macroeconomics began as a response
to the Great Depression, he declared that it was time for the field to
move on: the "central problem of depression-prevention," he declared,
"has been solved, for all practical purposes."
His openness to new ideas is refreshing. Krugman is also clear
that socialism failed for political as well as economic reasons.
[k185] For the first time since 1917, then, we live in a world in
which property rights and free markets are viewed as fundamental
principles, not grudging expedients; where the unpleasant aspects of a
market system--inequality, unemployment, injustice--are accepted as
facts of life. As in the Victorian era, capitalism is secure not only
because of its successes--which, as we will see in a moment, have been
very real--but because nobody has a plausible alternative. This
situation will not last forever. Surely there will be other
ideologies, other dreams; and they will emerge sooner rather than
later if the current economic crisis persists and deepens. But for now
capitalism rules the world unchallenged. The great enemies of
capitalist stability have always been war and depression. War,
[k203] In particular, why do market economies experience recessions?
Whatever you do, don't say that the answer is obvious--that recessions
occur because of X, where X is the prejudice of your choice. The truth
is that if you think about it--especially if you understand and
generally believe in the idea that markets usually manage to match
supply and demand--a recession is a very peculiar thing indeed. For
during an economic slump, especially a severe one, supply seems to be
everywhere and demand nowhere.
[k244] Never trust an aircraft designer who refuses to play with model
airplanes, and never trust an economic pundit who refuses to play with
model economies.
[k255] The lesson for the real world is that your vulnerability to the
business cycle may have little or nothing to do with your more
fundamental economic strengths and weaknesses: bad things can happen
to good economies.
[k269] But the fundamentals are the same: a recession is normally a
matter of the public as a whole trying to accumulate cash (or, what is
the same thing, trying to save more than it invests) and can normally
be cured simply by issuing more coupons.
I have a problem with simplistic views of full employment. People
are not interchangeable. You cannot turn a car mechanic into a web
developer overnight. As the economy of any country grows the jobs
available become more plentiful, but they are often the wrong type of
job. People do not adapt easily. It can take a decade to turn an
independent car mechanic into a web devloper. Who pays that person for
his education? How do you motivate that person to want to change? How
do you know that web developers will be needed in 10 years?
[k283] By the late 1960s many started to believe that the business
cycle was no longer a major problem; even Richard Nixon promised to
"fine-tune" the economy. This was hubris, and the tragic flaw of
full-employment policies became apparent in the 1970s. If the central
bank is overoptimistic about how many jobs can be created, if it puts
too much money into circulation, the result is inflation. And once
that inflation has become deeply embedded in the public's
expectations, it can be wrung out of the system only through a period
of high unemployment.
[k311] And that sense of progress helped bring with it a new sense of
optimism about capitalism. Moreover, the new industries brought back
what we might call the romance of capitalism: the idea of the heroic
entrepreneur who builds a better mousetrap, and in so doing becomes
deservedly wealthy.
The problem I have with these comparisons is that GDP is but one
indicator of success. We can measure GDP statistically, but it does
not include cultural biases. For example, while my wife could choose
to work, she does not work right now. We felt it was important to
raise our children with at least one parent at home. Now that the kids
are grown, she is considering going back to work. That is our family's
cultural bias which happens to be the bias of many of the people who
work in my company. Even though population has grown in the US over my
lifetime, I am finding more and more people are choosing not to work
because they do not have to. To me that is success. However as fewer
people who can work choose not to work we are reducing the need for
services for people who work (fewer people commuting means lower
vehicle usage, fewer business lunches, etc.) and therefore the economy
can shrink while at the same time this particular definition of
success increases.
[k579] Between 1981 and 1989 the Mexican economy had grown at an
annual rate of only 1.3 percent, well short of population growth,
leaving per capita income far below its 1981 peak. From 1990 to 1994,
the years of the "Mexican miracle," things were definitely better: the
economy grew 2.8 percent per year. But this was still barely ahead of
population growth; as of 1994 Mexico was still, according to its own
statistics, far below its 1981 level. Where was the miracle--indeed,
[k618] What is supposed to happen when a country's currency is
devalued is that speculators say, "Okay, that's over," and stop
betting on the currency's continued decline. That's the way it worked
for Britain and Sweden in 1992. The danger is that speculators will
instead view the first devaluation as a sign of more to come, and
start speculating all the harder. In order to avoid that, a government
is supposed to follow certain rules. First, if you devalue at all,
make the devaluation big enough. Otherwise, you will simply set up
expectations of more to come. Second, immediately following the
devaluation, you must give every signal you can that everything is
under control, that you are responsible people who understand the
importance of treating investors right, and so on. Otherwise the
devaluation can crystallize doubts about your economy's soundness and
start a panic.
In my experience there is a big difference between investors and
ForEx traders. Buffet is an investor and Soros is a trader. The reason
for a swift drop in a currency's price has nothing to do with
investors and everything to do with traders. See my Objectively Rich
for more info.
[k627] Worse yet, it soon became clear that some Mexican businessmen
had been consulted about the devaluation in advance, giving them
inside information denied to foreign investors. Massive capital flight
was now inevitable, and the Mexican government soon had to abandon
fixing the exchange rate at all. Still, Serra Puche was quickly
replaced, and Mexico began making all the right noises. And one might
have thought that all the reforms since 1985 would count for
something. But no: foreign investors were shocked--shocked!--to
discover that Mexico was not the paragon it had seemed, and wanted out
at any cost. Soon the peso had fallen to half its pre-crisis value.
This is where Keynes's animal spirits are crucial to
accept. Buffet treats such panics as investment opportunities. This is
where the investors are separated from the traders. However, to be an
investor you have to have built up reserves for that rainy day when
investment opportunities present themselves. Unfortunately this means
you must be extremely disciplined and patient. You have to aim for 10
years out or more. You do not know what will be happening in 10 years,
but you do know some opportunity will present itself, and you will have
the capital to seize it. Note that capital does not have to mean cash
or equivalents. It might mean an organization primed for an
opportunity which it can handle.
[k649] Perhaps Argentina was attacked because to Yanqui investors all
Latin American nations look alike. But once speculation against the
Argentine peso began, it became clear that the currency board did not
provide the kind of insulation its creators had hoped for. True,
[k712] What we should have asked was the question posed in many
meetings by the economist Guillermo Calvo, of the World Bank and later
of the University of Maryland: "Why was so large a punishment imposed
for so small a crime?" In the aftermath of the tequila crisis it was
all too easy to revisit the policies followed by Mexico in the run-up
to that crisis, and find them full of error. But the fact was that at
the time they seemed pretty good, and even after the fact it was hard
to find any missteps large enough to justify the economic catastrophe
of 1995.
[k717] We should have looked more closely at the arguments of some
commentators that there really were no serious mistakes at all, except
for the brief series of fumbles that got Mexico on the wrong side of
market perceptions and set in motion a process of self-justifying
panic. And we should therefore also have realized that what happened
to Mexico could happen elsewhere: that the seeming success of an
economy, the admiration of markets and media for its managers, was no
guarantee that the economy was immune to sudden financial crisis.
[k728] Perhaps most of all, we failed to understand the extent to
which both Mexico and Washington simply got lucky. The rescue wasn't
really a well-considered plan that addressed the essence of the
crisis: it was an emergency injection of cash to a beleaguered
government, which did its part by adopting painful measures less
because they were clearly related to the economic problems than
because by demonstrating the government's seriousness they might
restore market confidence. They succeeded, albeit only after the
economy had been punished severely, but there was no good reason to
suppose that such a strategy would work the next time.
[k802] At the beginning of 1990 the market capitalization of
Japan--the total value of all the stocks of all the nation's
companies--was larger than that of the United States, which had twice
Japan's population and more than twice its gross domestic product.
[k806] The late 1980s represented a time of prosperity for Japan, of
fast growth, low unemployment, and high profits. Nonetheless, nothing
in the underlying economic data justified the tripling of both land
and stock prices during that period. Even at the time many observers
thought that there was something manic and irrational about the
financial boom--that traditional companies in slowly growing
industries should not be valued like growth stocks, with
price-earnings ratios of 60 or more. But as is so often the case in
manic markets, the skeptics were without the resources, or the
courage, to back their lack of conviction; conventional wisdom found
all sorts of justifications for the sky-high prices.
[k849] Modern nations, even if they do not explicitly guarantee
deposits, cannot find it in their hearts to let widows and orphans
lose their life savings simply because they put them in the wrong
bank, just as they cannot bring themselves to stand aside when the
raging river sweeps away houses foolishly built in the flood
plain. Only the most hard-nosed of conservatives would wish it
otherwise. But the result is that people are careless about where they
build their houses, and even more careless about where they store
their money.
[k953] The Great Depression in the United States was brought to an end
by a massive deficit-financed public works program, known as World War
II.
[k1184] Sometimes a panic is just a panic: an irrational reaction on
the part of investors that is not justified by the actual news. An
example might be the brief plunge in the dollar in 1981, after a
deranged gunman wounded Ronald Reagan.
[k1188] Much more important in economics, however, are panics that,
whatever sets them off, validate themselves--because the panic itself
makes panic justified. The classic example is a bank run: when all of
a bank's depositors try to withdraw their money at once, the bank is
forced to sell its assets at distress prices, causing it to go
bankrupt; those depositors who did not panic end up worse off than
those who did.
Given the speed with the Thai crisis spread it is likely that the
problems were caused by speculation more than anything else. I don't
buy the argument that it was "other companies" at all. Just like in
the US in the current crisis, financial institutions overextended
themselves with high risk investments.
[k1198] Unfortunately, both the decline in the currency's value and
the rise in interest rates created financial problems for businesses,
both financial institutions and other companies. On one side, many of
them had dollar debts, which suddenly became more burdensome as the
number of baht per dollar increased; on the other, many of them also
had baht debts, which became harder to service as interest rates
soared.
[k1412] What the story of the globo and its demise tells us is that
countries cannot get all three wishes; at most, they can get two. They
can give up on exchange rate stability; this means adopting a floating
exchange rate, like the United States and Australia did. They can give
up on discretionary monetary policy; this means fixing the exchange
rate, the way Argentina did in the 1990s, and possibly even giving up
their own currency, like the nations of continental Europe did. Or
they can give up on the principle of completely free markets and
impose capital controls; this was what most countries did between the
1940s and the 1960s, and what China does right now.
We live in an age which amplifies the herd and hence speculation
can be extremely profitable as Soros has shown. It is not that Soros
is genius rather the particular herd psychology of his time is matched
to his psychology. Plenty of fallen stars demonstrate times change and
Soros is left standing as a survivor. Unfortunately unlike in biology
Soros is not replicating. Whatever his organization does is unique and
it has to be this way or the Soros strategy would fail due to the
nature of the closed system of markets.
[k1470] The funny thing is that once you take the possibility of
self-fulfilling crises seriously, market psychology becomes
crucial--so crucial that within limits, the expectations, even the
prejudices of investors, become economic fundamentals--because
believing makes it so.
[k1602] Hedge funds with good reputations have been able to take
positions as much as a hundred times as large as their owners'
capital; that means that a 1 percent rise in the price of their
assets, or decline in the price of their liabilities, doubles that
capital. The downside, of course, is that a hedge fund can also lose
money very efficiently.
[k1635] It worked. Soros's high-profile assault on the pound began in
August. Within weeks Britain had spent nearly $50 billion in the
foreign exchange markets to defend the pound, to no avail. In
mid-September the government raised interest rates to defend the
currency, but this proved politically unacceptable. After only three
days Britain dropped out of the ERM, and the pound was set afloat
(where it remains to this day). Soros not only made roughly a billion
dollars in quick capital gains but also established himself as perhaps
the most famous speculator of all time.
[k1646] Finally, did Soros do his victims any harm? The government of
Prime Minister John Major never recovered from the humiliation. But it
is actually possible to argue that Soros did the British nation as a
whole a favor.
[k1675] Nonetheless, Mahathir clearly should have kept his mouth
shut. At a time when confidence in his economy was already plunging,
the sight of the prime minister raving about an American conspiracy
against Asia--and broadly hinting that it was in fact, yes, a Jewish
conspiracy--was not what the money doctors would have prescribed.
[k1836] It is important to realize that even now Fed officials are not
quite sure how they pulled this rescue off. At the height of the
crisis it seemed entirely possible that cutting interest rates would
be entirely ineffectual--after all, if nobody can borrow, what
difference does it make what the price would be if they could? And if
everyone had believed that the world was coming to an end, their panic
might--as in so many other countries--have ended up being a
self-fulfilling prophecy. In retrospect Greenspan seemed to have been
like a general who rides out in front of his demoralized army, waves
his sword and shouts encouragement, and somehow turns the tide of
battle: well done, but not something you would want to count on
working next time.
[k1850] When Greenspan left office, he did so trailing clouds of
glory. Alan Blinder of Princeton University pronounced him possibly
the greatest central banker in history. When Greenspan made one of his
final appearances before Congress, he was hailed virtually as a
monetary messiah: "You have guided monetary policy through
stock-market crashes, wars, terrorist attacks and natural disasters,"
declared one congressman. "You have made a great contribution to the
prosperity of the U.S. and the nation is in your debt." Almost three
years later, Greenspan's name was mud.
[k2141] The financial crisis has, inevitably, led to a hunt for
villains. Some of the accusations are entirely spurious, like the
claim, popular on the right, that all our problems were caused by the
Community Reinvestment Act, which supposedly forced banks to lend to
minority home buyers who then defaulted on their mortgages; in fact,
the act was passed in 1977, which makes it hard to see how it can be
blamed for a crisis that didn't happen until three decades
later. Anyway, the act applied only to depository banks, which
accounted for a small fraction of the bad loans during the housing
bubble.
[k2155] Yet the crisis, for the most part, hasn't involved problems
with deregulated institutions that took new risks. Instead, it has
involved risks taken by institutions that were never regulated in the
first place. And that, I'd argue, is the core of what happened. As the
shadow banking system expanded to rival or even surpass conventional
banking in importance, politicians and government officials should
have realized that we were re-creating the kind of financial
vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible--and they should
have responded by extending regulation and the financial safety net to
cover these new institutions.
[k2167] Meanwhile, the people who should have been worrying about the
fragility of the system were, instead, singing the praises of
"financial innovation." "Not only have individual financial
institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk
factors," declared Alan Greenspan in 2004, "but also the financial
system as a whole has become more resilient."
[k2498] We have magneto trouble, said John Maynard Keynes at the start
of the Great Depression: most of the economic engine was in good
shape, but a crucial component, the financial system, wasn't
working. He also said this: "We have involved ourselves in a colossal
muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the
working of which we do not understand." Both statements are as true
now as they were then.
What we need is verification which identifies all large capital
flows within companies. The cost of verification is tiny in comparison
to the cost of bailouts. In software we have learned that dynamic
systems need executable assertions. The same is true for dynamic
financial systems. The larger the capital and the faster it flows, the
greater the risk.
[k2509] I won't try to lay out the details of a new regulatory regime,
but the basic principle should be clear: anything that has to be
rescued during a financial crisis, because it plays an essential role
in the financial mechanism, should be regulated when there isn't a
crisis so that it doesn't take excessive risks. Since the 1930s
commercial banks have been required to have adequate capital, hold
reserves of liquid assets that can be quickly converted into cash, and
limit the types of investments they make, all in return for federal
guarantees when things go wrong. Now that we've seen a wide range of
non-bank institutions create what amounts to a banking crisis,
comparable regulation has to be extended to a much larger part of the
system.