by Marvin Minsky, Simon & Schuster, November 7, 2006, 978-0743276634
This is my first Marvin Minksy book. I've read about his ideas,
and probably read a few articles by him. The book is well written
and covers many ideas on how the brain might work. It took me a while
to read it, because there was so much information.
He uses a platontic-dialectic style by injecting rhetorical
comments/questions by characters (Citizen, Student, etc.). The device
worked ok in this book, but I found it a bit tedious. Perhaps I'd
prefer a simple rhetorical question than the text interspersed with
fictional character comments.
[p5] Citizen: I still think your view of emotions ignores too
much. For example, emotional states like fear and disgust involve the
body as well as the brain, as when we feel discomfort in the chest or
gut, or palpitations of the heart, or when we feel faint or tremble or
sweat.
I agree that this view may seem too extreme-but sometimes, to explore
new ideas, we need to set our old ones aside, at least
temporarily. For example, in the most popular view, emotions are
deeply involved with our bodies' conditions. However, Chapter 7 will
take the opposite view, by regarding our body parts as resources that
our brains can use to change [p6] (or main rain) their mental stares!
For example, you sometimes Can make yourself persist at a plan by
maintaining a certain facial expression.
[p6] Accordingly, when we design machines to mimic our minds-that is,
to create Artificial Intelligences-we'll need to make sure that those
machines, root, are equipped with sufficient diversity:
If a program works in only one way, then it gets stuck when that
method fails. But a program that has several ways to proceed could
then switch to some other approach, or search for a suitable
substitute.
This idea is a central theme of this book-and it is firmly opposed to
the popular view that each person has a central core-some sort of
invisible spirit or self-from which all their mental abilities
originate. For that seems a demeaning idea-that all our virtues are
secondhand-or that we deserve no credit for our accomplishments,
because they come to us as gifts from some other source. Instead, I
see our dignity as stemming from what we each have made of ourselves:
a colossal collection of different ways to deal with different
situations and predicaments. It is that diversity that distinguishes
us from most of the other animals-and from all the machines that we've
built in the past-and every chapter of this book will discuss some of
the sources of our uniquely human resourcefulness.
I enjoy the concept of suitcase-like words. It's important to be
able to pick apart the words we use every day as if they mean one
thing; they don't. Words are complex conceptions. Understanding
words requires talking about them in a particular context, and even
then, we have different connotations for the same word.
[p97] All this should lead us to conclude that consciousness is a
suitcase-like word that we use to refer to many different mental
activities, which don't have a single cause or origin-and, surely,
this is why people have found it so hard to "understand what
consciousness is." The trouble was that they tried to pack into a
single box all the products of many processes that go on in different
parts of our brains-and this produced a problem that will remain
unsolvable until we find ways to chop it up. However, once we imagine
a mind as made of smaller parts, we can replace that single, big
problem by many smaller, more solvable ones-which is just what this
chapter will try to do.
The following is a strong argument for testing as a critical part
of software evolution.
[p105] The same sort of constraint also seems to apply whenever we try
to improve the performance of any large system. For example, after
every change we make in an existing computer program, we usually find
that this has created additional bugs-and then we need to make yet
more corrections. In fact, many computer systems eventually become so
ponderous that their further development Stops, because their
programmers can no longer keep track of what all the previous
programmers did.
Similarly, it appears that our brains result from processes in which
each new part in based on some older designs, but also includes
exceptions to it. Indeed, I suspect that large parts of our brains
work mainly to correct mistakes that other parts make-and this is
surely one reason why the subject of human psychology has become so
hard. We can expect to discover neat rules and laws that partly
explain many aspects of how we think. However, every such "law of
thought" will also need a sizable list of exceptions to it. So
psychology will never be much like physics, in which we frequently
find "unified theories" that work flawlessly.
[p112] Aaron Sloman 1994: "People are too impatient. They want a three-line
definition of consciousness and a five-line proof that a computational
system can or cannot have consciousness. And they want it today. They
don't want to do the hard work of unraveling complex and muddled
concepts that we already have, and exploring new variants that could
emerge from precisely specified architectures for behaving systems."
[p180] I do not mean to dismiss all prospects of building a
baby-machine, but I suspect that any such system would develop too
slowly unless (or until) it was equipped with adequate ways to
represent knowledge (see Chapter 8). In any case, iv seems fairly
clear that human brains are innately equipped with highly developed
ways to learn (some of which don't start to operate until long after
birth). The researchers who have tried to build such machines have
used quire a few ingenious schemes, but it seems to me that each of
those machines got stuck because of not having ways to overcome one or
more problems like these:
[p181] The Optimization Paradox: The better a system already works,
the more likely each change will make it worse-so it gets more
difficult for it to find more ways to improve itself
The Investment Principle: The better a certain process works, the more
we will tend to rely on it, and the less we will be further inclined
to develop new alternatives--especially when a new technique won't
yield good results until you become proficient with it.
The Complexity Barrier: The more that the parts of a system interact,
the more likely each change will have unexpected side effects.
Evolution is often described as a process of selecting beneficial
changes but most of evolution's work involves rejecting changes that
have bad effects! This surely is why most species evolve to occupy
narrow, specialized niches that are bounded by all sorts of hazards
and traps. It is not often recognized that while genetic evolution can
"learn" to avoid the most common kinds of mistakes, it is virtually
incapable of learning large numbers of very uncommon mistakes. Indeed,
only a few "higher animals" have escaped from this by evolving
language-like systems through which they can inform their descendants
about accidents that happened to some of their ancestors' relatives.
[p185] Alan Watts 1960: "No one imagines that a symphony is supposed
to improve in quality as it goes along, at that the whole object of
playing it is to teach the finale. The point of music is discovered in
every moment of playing and listening to it. It is the same, I feel,
with the greater part of our lives, and if we are unduly absorbed in
improving them we may forget altogether to live them."
[p206] Douglas Lenat 1997: "Analogy works because there is a lot of
common causality in the world, common causes which lead to an overlap
between two systems, between two phenomena or whatever. We, as human
beings, can only observe a tiny bit of that overlap; a tiny bit of
what is going on at this level of the world .... [So] whenever we find
an overlap at this level, it is worth seeing if in fact there are
additional overlap features, even though we do not understand the
cause or causality behind it.
[p210] Decisiveness: We often speak of "making a choice," as though
this were a deliberate act. However, that "action" may. in fact, be
nothing more than the moment at which you stopped some process that
was comparing alternatives-and then, by default, you simply adopted
the one that was then at the top of some list. In such a case, a
person may speak of using "free will"-but an observer could also see
it as nothing more than a sort of admission (or even a boast) that one
does not have a clear idea about what mental process produced that
result.
[p239] Poincare 1913: "What is it indeed that gives us the feeling of
elegance in a solution, in a demonstration? It is the harmony of the
diverse parts, their symmetry, their happy balance; it is all that
introduces order, all that gives unity, that permits us to see clearly
and to comprehend at once both the ensemble and the details."
[p257] If you "understand" something in only one way, then you
scarcely understand it at all-because when something goes wrong,
you'll have no place to go. Bur if you represent something in several
ways, then when one method fails, you can switch to another. Thar way,
you can rum things around in your mind to see them from different
points of view-until you find one that works for you!
[p271] As children, we not only learn particular things, but we also
acquire new thinking techniques. However, no infant could ever invent,
by itself, enough co develop an adult intelligence. So perhaps our
most important skill is how we learn, not only from having our own
experiences, but also from being told things by other people.
[p275] "The best way to have a good idea is to have lots of ideas."
-- Linus Pauling
We admire our Einsteins, Shakespeares, and Beethovens-and many people
insist that their accomplishments ate inspired by "gifts" that cannot
be explained. If so, then machines could never do such things because
(at least, in that popular view) no machine could hold any such
mysteries.
However, when one has the fortune to meet one of those persons whom we
portray as "great," one finds no single, unusual trait that seems to
account for their excellence. Instead (at least it seems to me), all
that we find are unusual combinations of otherwise common
ingredients. I.
They are highly proficient in their fields. (But by itself we just
call this expertise.)
They have more than usual self-confidence. (Hence better to withstand
the scorn of peers.)
They often persist where others would quit. (But others may just call
this stubbornness.)
They accumulate more Ways to Think. (But then they'll need better ways
to switch.)
They habitually think in novel ways. (But so do others, albeit less
frequently.)
They have better systems for self-control. (So they waste less time on
irrelevant goals.)
[p278] This section has mainly aimed to explain why some people get
better ideas than others do. But what if we change that question to
ask, instead, what could make one person become less resourceful than
another one? Here is one process that could tend to limit the growth
of ones versatility:
The Investment Principle: If you know two different ways to achieve
the same goal, you'll usually start with the method that you know
best. Then, over time, that method may gain so much additional
strength that you'll tend to use it exclusively---even if you have
been told that the other technique is the better one.
[p328] For example, whenever something touches your hand, it seems to
you that you instantly sense that you have felt a touch on your
hand-and that this happened immediately, without any complex
processing. Similarly, when you look at a color and sense that it's
red, no intermediate steps seem to intervene-and so you can find
nothing to say about it. Surely this is at least partly why so many
philosophical thinkers conclude that there can be no "mechanical"
explanation of why different stimuli seem each to have particular
qualities: they simply have not worked hard enough to imagine adequate
models of those processes; instead, they mainly attempted to show that
no such models would ever be possible.